Seventh Circuit Review
Volume 12

Issue 1

Article 3

5-1-2017

Married on Saturday, Fired on Monday: The Seventh Circuit
Attempts to Navigate LGBT Rights After Obergefell
Symone D. Shinton

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Symone D. Shinton, Married on Saturday, Fired on Monday: The Seventh Circuit Attempts to Navigate
LGBT Rights After Obergefell, 12 Seventh Circuit Rev. 33 (2017).
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol12/iss1/3

This Civil Rights Law is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College
of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Seventh Circuit Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons
@ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu,
ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu.

Shinton: Married on Saturday, Fired on Monday: The Seventh Circuit Attempt

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 12, Issue 1

Fall 2016

MARRIED ON SATURDAY, FIRED ON MONDAY:
THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT ATTEMPTS TO
NAVIGATE LGBT RIGHTS AFTER OBERGEFELL
SYMONE D. SHINTON
Cite as: Symone D. Shinton, Married on Saturday, Fired on Monday: The Seventh
Circuit Attempts to Navigate LGBT Rights After Obergefell, 12 SEVENTH CIRCUIT
REV. 33 (2016), at http://www.kentlaw.iit.edu/Documents/Academic Programs/7CR
/v12-1/shinton.pdf.

INTRODUCTION
Non-heterosexual persons1 have suffered and continue to suffer
significant oppression in the United States. Nearly two-thirds of LGBT
Americans have reported experiencing discrimination in their personal
lives, outside of the workplace.2 Nearly half have reported

 J.D. candidate, May 2017, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology; B.S., International Affairs, Florida State University 2014. I would like
to thank Ms. Bridget Keely and Ms. Traci Bennett for inspiring me to write this
article and living lives that prove love wins.
1
This Comment recognizes that gender and sexuality are fluid concepts that
occur on a spectrum, and human beings often do not fit neatly into one category. See
The Kinsey Scale, KINSEY INSTITUTE INDIANA UNIVERSITY,
https://www.kinseyinstitute.org/research/publications/kinsey-scale.php (last accessed
Oct. 13, 2016). For the sake of brevity, I will refer to this non-heterosexual
community by the term “LGBT.” Please see the following source for an explanation
of the term. What Does LGBTQ+ Mean?, OK2BME,
http://ok2bme.ca/resources/kids-teens/what-does-lgbtq-mean/ (last accessed Oct. 13,
2016).
2
Brandon Lorenz, New HRC Poll Shows Overwhelming Support for Federal
LGBT Non-Discrimination Bill, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN (Mar. 17, 2015),
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experiencing discrimination in the workplace.3 And one in ten reported
being fired from a job because of their sexual orientation.4 This
oppression not only impacts LGBT individuals’ social well-being5 but
their legal rights as citizens.6
The gay rights movement formally began on July 27, 1969 at the
Stonewall Inn in New York to protest this inequality.7 Some of the
major goals of the movement were the decriminalization of
homosexual acts, the dissemination of accurate information about
homosexuality, and, ultimately, equal rights under the laws that protect
heterosexuals.8 The movement has achieved monumental
accomplishments. In 1973, the American Psychiatric Association

http://www.hrc.org/blog/new-hrc-poll-shows-overwhelming-support-for-federallgbt-non-discrimination.
3
Id.
4
Katy Steinmetz, Lawmakers to Introduce Historic LGBT Non-Discrimination
Bills, TIME (July 23, 2015), http://time.com/3968995/equality-act-congress-lgbt/.
5
“Institutional and personal hostility toward lesbians and gay men is a fact of
life in the United States today.” Gregory M. Herek, Stigma, Prejudice, and Violence
Against Lesbians and Gay Men, in Homosexuality: Research Implications for Public
Policy 60-80 (John C. Gonsiorek & James D. Weinrich eds. 1991).
6
In April of 1953, President Eisenhower signed Executive Order 10450,
banning homosexuals from working for the federal government or any of its private
contractors, describing homosexuals as “security risks” equal to that of alcoholics
and neurotics. Exec. Order No. 10450, 18 Fed. Reg. 2489 (Apl. 27, 1953). Of
course, states were permitted to criminalize homosexual behavior until as recent as
2003. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). The only recently repealed “Don’t
Ask Don’t Tell” policy governed homosexuals in the military from 1993-2011.
Ethan Klapper, On This Day in 1993, Bill Clinton Announced ‘Don’t Ask Don’t
Tell,’ HUFFPOST (July 19, 2013 11:01 am ET),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/19/bill-clinton-dont-ask-donttell_n_3623245.html.
7
Christina Caron & Adrianne Haney, Gay Rights Timeline: Key Dates in the
Fight for Equality, ABC NEWS (Sat. Mar. 23, 2013 2:23 AM)
http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/03/23/17418872-gay-rights-timeline-keydates-in-the-fight-for-equality.
8
Michael Levy, Gay Rights Movement, BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/gay-rights-movement (last updated July 17, 2015).
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declassified homosexuality as a mental disorder.9 In 1982, the first
state enacted legislation outlawing discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation.10 In 2003, the Supreme Court prohibited laws that
criminalize private, consensual sex between homosexuals.11 In 2004,
the first state, Massachusetts, legalized gay marriage.12 In 2010,
Congress repealed “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell.”13 And in 2015, the
Supreme Court declared the right to marry to be a fundamental
constitutional right in Obergefell v. Hodges, effectively permitting
same-sex couples to legally marry nation-wide.14
But Obergefell did not mark the end of the LGBT community’s
“liberation struggle.”15 In the wake of Obergefell, conservatives and
religious groups alike celebrated Rowan County, Kentucky, Clerk Kim
Davis’ outright defiance to comply with the law by refusing to issue
9

Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2596 (2015) (“Only in more recent
years have psychiatrists and others recognized that sexual orientation is both a
normal expression of human sexuality and immutable.”).
10
Act of Feb. 25, 1981, ch. 112, 1981, Wis. Sess. Laws; See also William B.
Turner, “The Gay Rights State”: Wisconsin’s Pioneering Legislation to Prohibit
Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation, 22 WIS. WOMEN’S L. J. 91 (2007).
11
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558.
12
Goodridge v. Mass. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 789 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003);
Rose Arce, Same-Sex Couples Ready to Make History in Massachusetts, CNN (Mon.
May 17, 2004 4:41 AM EDT)
http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/05/17/mass.gay.marriage/.
13
“Don’t Ask Don’t Tell,” a military policy enacted by President Clinton,
prohibited the participation of openly gay or lesbian members in the military.
“Closeted” individuals were permitted to participate, so long as they were not
“outed.” Jesse Lee, The President Signs Repeal of “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell”,
WHITEHOUSE.GOV (Dec. 22, 2010, 12:35pm),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/12/22/president-signs-repeal-dont-ask-donttell-out-many-we-are-one.
14
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2584.
15
“My gay and lesbian friends have no illusions that Obergefell marks the end
of what one with whom I partied at a gay pride event in Brooklyn last night called
their ‘liberation struggle.’” Michael Dorf, Symposium: In Defense of Justice
Kennedy’s Soaring Language, SCOTUSBLOG (June 27, 2015 5:08 pm),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/06/symposium-in-defense-of-justice-kennedyssoaring-language/.
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marriage licenses to gay couples.16 Private business owners raised
religious exercise and free speech defenses to support their refusals to
comply with state Anti-Discrimination Acts that protect
homosexuals.17 And Title VII still permits employers18 to lawfully
discriminate against non-heterosexual employees.19
This Comment will explore the decades of precedent that forced
the hand of the Seventh Circuit in Hively v. Ivy Tech Community
College to conclude that Title VII still does not prohibit employers
from discriminating against employees based on their sexual
orientation.20 After discussing the backdrop of Title VII, this Comment
will review Congress’s historical inaction to intervene on behalf of the
LGBT community and protect their status. Finally, this Comment will
discuss solutions to the conundrum: the LGBT community is free to
get married on Saturday but risk losing their jobs on Monday for the
very realization of that right.21 As Hively was recently vacated and
16

Chris Johnson, Kim Davis Celebrated as Hero at Conservative Summit,
WASHINGTON BLADE (Sept. 26, 2015 1:24pm EDT),
http://www.washingtonblade.com/2015/09/26/kim-davis-celebrated-as-hero-atconservative-summit/.
17
See, e.g., Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272 (Col. Ct. App.
2015).
18
Title VII defines “employer” as a person “engaged in an industry affecting
commerce who has [twenty-five] or more employees for each working day in each of
twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or proceeding calendar year, and any
agent of such person” excluding the United States, a corporation wholly owned by
the United States government, an Indian tribe, any department or agency of the
District of Columbia subject by statute to procedures of the competitive service,
bona fide private membership clubs that are exempt from taxation under section
501(c) of Title 26. 42 U.S.C. §2000e(b) (2012).
19
42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a)(1) (2012) (listing ‘sex’ but not ‘sexual orientation’).
20
Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College, 830 F.3d 698, 717 (7th Cir. 2016),
reh'g en banc granted, opinion vacated, No. 15-1720, 2016 WL 6768628 (7th Cir.
Oct. 11, 2016).
21
Hively, 830 F.3d at 714. (“The cases as they stand do, however, create a
paradoxical legal landscape in which a person can be married on Saturday and then
fired on Monday for just that act. For although federal law now guarantees anyone
the right to marry another person of the same gender, Title VII, to the extent it does
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scheduled to be reheard en banc, there is hope that the Seventh Circuit
will revisit its conclusions.22 Nonetheless, courts are justifiably
uncomfortable solving this problem, as most traditional tools of
statutory interpretation work against extending protections to the
LGBT community. This Comment concludes that although the best
solution for protecting the LGBT community in the workplace is not
piece-meal through the courts, but long-lasting, sweeping change from
Congress, the Seventh Circuit should find that discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation is prohibited by Title VII. It should do so on
the theory that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is
discriminating on the basis of one’s failure to live up to their gender
norms and stereotypes. Regardless of the Seventh Circuit’s holding,
Congress must address this inequality and act by passing The Equality
Act. Until Congress does so, LGBT discrimination in the workplace
will operate as the modern day “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.”23
I. TITLE VII JURISPRUDENCE
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits “discrimination
on the basis of . . . sex.”24 But is sexual orientation “sex?” Decades of
precedent relying in part on the legislative intent of Title VII have by
and large answered that question “no.” While largely uncontroversial
in the past, this answer is now difficult to reconcile with Obergefell.
The political momentum of treating the LGBT community with full
equality under the law has placed this once taken for granted result in
great tension.

not reach sexual orientation discrimination, also allows employers to fire that
employee for doing so.”).
22
Hively v. Ivy Tech Commuity College, No. 15-1720, 2016 WL 6768628 (7th
Cir. Oct. 11, 2016).
23
Full Seventh Circuit Agrees to Rehear Lambda Legal’s Indiana Employment
Discrimination Case, LAMBDA LEGAL (Oct. 11, 2016),
http://www.lambdalegal.org/blog/20161011_7th-circuit-en-banc-hively-rehearingemployment-discrimination.
24
42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a)(1) (2012).
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So how did we get here? Federal courts agree that “sex”
discrimination is not “sexual orientation” discrimination, and an
employee may legally be discriminated against on the basis of their
sexual orientation.25 But early Supreme Court precedent paved the
way for a potential, narrow exception to protect LGBT rights: framing
the claim in “gender stereotype” terms. A “gender stereotype” claim is
simple in theory: an employee has a claim for “sex” discrimination
when they are fired for failing to conform to the stereotypes associated
with their sex. For example, a woman who is fired for behaving
masculine or a man that is fired for behaving effeminately may state a
gender stereotype claim for sex discrimination under Title VII.
But this analysis is complicated when sexual orientation enters the
picture. A gay may be protected if he is fired for acting flamboyant or
effeminate—contrary to stereotypical male behavior— but not if he is
fired for being gay. With support of the EEOC, some district courts
have refused to follow what they believe is a meaningless distinction.
The Seventh Circuit in Hively, however, continued to attempt to
separate the two claims, protecting those based on gender stereotypes
but not those based upon sexual identity.
A.

Supreme Court Precedent

In 1989, the Supreme Court decided Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
which held that discriminating against an employee for failing to
conform to a gender stereotype is sex discrimination prohibited by
Title VII.26 Of course, Price Waterhouse had nothing to do with sexual
orientation. The Plaintiff, Ann Hopkins, brought suit after she was
refused admission as partner at an accounting firm essentially because
she was not feminine enough.27

25

See, e.g., Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 261 (3d Cir.
2001); Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 762 (6th Cir. 2006); Medina v.
Income Support Div., N.M., 413 F.3d 1131, 1135 (10th Cir. 2005).
26
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
27
Id.

38
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol12/iss1/3

6

Shinton: Married on Saturday, Fired on Monday: The Seventh Circuit Attempt

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 12, Issue 1

Fall 2016

Even though she had recently secured a $25 million contract for
the firm and was recommended as performing “virtually at the partner
level” already, her superiors were concerned by her “abrasive” and
“brusque” personality that was “difficult to work with.”28 Of course,
by “abrasive” her superiors actually meant “macho,”
“overcompensated for being a woman,” unladylike, and in need of “a
course at charm school.”29 Indeed, one supervisor advised Ann to
“walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely,
wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry” if she wanted
to improve her chances of partnership in the future.30
Stating that under the plain language of Title VII “gender must be
irrelevant to employment decisions,” the Court found that
discriminating against Ms. Hopkins for failing to conform to
stereotypes of what a woman should be squarely falls within the
prohibitions of Title VII.31 In other words, employers cannot
discriminate against men for being feminine or women for being
masculine. Finding that Ms. Hopkins proved her gender played a
motivating part in her employment decision, the Court remanded to
determine whether the employer was still not liable because they
would have made that decision anyway, irrespective of gender.32
In Price Waterhouse, the Court affirmed that Congress’s purpose
in enacting Title VII was broad and aimed to “strike at the entire
spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex
stereotypes.”33 While seeking to preserve employer freedom and
choice, Congress hoped to drive employers to focus on employee
qualifications rather than on the individual’s identity and immutable
28

Id. at 234–235.
Id. at 235.
30
Id.
31
Id. at 240.
32
Id. at 258. The Court established that after a Title VII plaintiff proves gender
played a role, an employer may still evade liability if it can prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same decision regardless
of gender.
33
Id. at 251 (quoting Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435
U.S. 702, 707, n. 13 (1978)) (emphasis added).
29
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characteristics.34 The Court stated that as a society we were “beyond
the day when an employer could evaluate employees by assuming or
insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with their
group.”35
Later, in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., the
Supreme Court held that sex discrimination consisting of same-sex
sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII.36 Writing for a
unanimous court, Justice Scalia acknowledged that same-sex sexual
harassment was “assuredly not the principal evil Congress was
concerned with when it enacted Title VII.”37 Even so, “statutory
prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably
comparable evils, and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather
than the principal concerns of our legislators by which we are
governed.”38 In other words, Title VII need not be limited to apply
only to the exact concerns addressed by its enacting legislators. It
should be extended to cover “reasonably comparable evils” that fit
within the letter of the law.
This lends credence to the argument that “sexual orientation” is
“sex” and therefore a protected class. But this argument has still not
been accepted.39 Under the current prevailing view of Title VII,
employees can bring discrimination claims based on gender
stereotyping but not sexual orientation.40 In other words, if the
homosexual employee looks or acts “sufficiently flamboyant (if male)
or butch (if female),” they will receive Title VII protection whereas the
homosexual employee that does not openly violate traditional gender

34

Id. at 243.
Id. at 251
36
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv’s, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 75 (1998).
37
Id. at 79.
38
Id. (emphasis added).
39
See generally Brian Soucek, Perceived Homosexuals: Looking Gay Enough
for Title VII, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 715 (2014).
40
Id.
35

40
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norms will not.41 The Supreme Court has not directly addressed the
specific issue of whether Title VII protections extend to the LGBT
community.
B.
1.

Federal Court Decisions and the EEOC

Seventh Circuit Precedent and Beyond: Protecting “Sex” But
Not “Sexual Orientation”

The Seventh Circuit has always excluded the LGBT community
from Title VII’s reach.42 Indeed, it has expressly stated that not only
did Congress intend for “sex” to have a “narrow, traditional
interpretation” but that Congress even intended to “exclude
homosexuals from Title VII coverage.”43 Time and time again, the
Seventh Circuit has made clear that “sex” only encompasses the
biological male and female.44
In Hamner v. St Vincent Hospital and Health Care Center, Gary
Hamner, a male nurse, sued his former employer, a hospital, alleging
that he was unlawfully terminated under Title VII in retaliation for
submitting a sexual harassment grievance.45 Mr. Hamner alleged that a
coworker refused to communicate with him even when necessary for
patient care, screamed at him, and openly mocked him by lisping,

41

Soucek, supra note 40; see, e.g., Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d
1061, 1068 (9th Cir. 2002) (recognizing sex discrimination claim of gay male
employee who was taunted and harassed for having feminine traits).
42
See, e.g., Johnson v. Hondo, Inc., 125 F.3d 408, 413–14 (7th Cir. 1997)
(concluding that a slew of gay epithets could not sustain a claim of gender
discrimination where there was no evidence that the plaintiff failed to conform to
male stereotypes).
43
Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1084 (7th Cir. 1984)
(refusing to extend coverage to transsexuals under Title VII because “sex” does not
encompass “sexual identity”) (emphasis added).
44
Doe by Doe v. City of Belleville, Illinois, 119 F.3d 563, 572 (7th Cir. 1997).
45
Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 224 F.3d 701, 703
(7th Cir. 2000).

41
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flipping his wrists, and making jokes about homosexuals.46 On direct
examination at trial, Mr. Hamner’s testimony damned his claim:“[i]t
was merely the fact that because I am gay, because that is just who I
am, he was opposed to that and he absolutely could not handle that.
And, so, it was constant harassment because of my sexual
orientation.”47 The court found that the employer’s grievance alleged
only sexual orientation harassment which is not protected by Title VII,
stating “Congress intended the term ‘sex’ to mean ‘biological male or
biological female,’ and not one’s sexuality or sexual orientation.”48
Similarly, in Spearman v. Ford Motor Company, Edison
Spearman sued his current employer, Ford Motor Company, alleging
that Ford subjected him to a hostile work environment of sexual
harassment.49 Amongst other things, Mr. Spearman’s coworker called
him a “little bitch,” that he hated his “gay ass” and threatened to go to
his residence and “f--- his gay faggot ass up.”50 A coworker wrote
graffiti on a bulletin board at work that stated: “Aids kills faggots dead
. . . RuPaul, RuSpearman.”51 But despite the “vulgar and sexually
explicit insults” that Mr. Spearman suffered at work, and testimony
that Ford indeed embodied a “masculine environment,” Mr. Spearman
had no relief under Title VII because his “co-workers maligned him
because of his apparent homosexuality, and not because of his sex.”52
Relying on this precedent, the next sixteen years of Seventh
Circuit precedent consistently refused to extend Title VII protections
to the LGBT community.53 Indeed, every federal court to consider the
46

Id..
Id. at 705.
48
Id. at 704 (quoting Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1085).
49
Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 231 F.3d 1080, 1082 (7th Cir. 2000).
50
Id.
51
Id. at 1083.
52
Id. at 1085.
53
Muhammad v. Caterpillar, Inc., 767 F.3d 694, 697 (7th Cir. 2014); Hamm v.
Weyauwega Milk Products, Inc., 332 F.3d 1058, 1062 (7th Cir. 2003) (“The
protections of Title VII have not been extended, however, to permit claims of
harassment based on an individual's sexual orientation.”); Schroeder v. Hamilton
47

42
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matter has found unequivocally found that sexual orientation is not a
protected class under Title VII.54 Although courts agree that
“[h]arassment on the basis of sexual orientation has no place in our
society” they refuse to extend such protections to the LGBT
community because “Congress has not yet seen fit [] to provide
protection against such harassment.”55
2.

The EEOC’s Evolved Stance: Sexual Orientation
Discrimination Is Sex Discrimination

The EEOC recently began pursuing sexual orientation
discrimination claims on the theory that sexual orientation
discrimination is sex discrimination. Dating back fifty years, the
EEOC’s stance previously excluded sexual orientation from claims
protected by Title VII.56 But in July 2015, the EEOC in Baldwin v.
Foxx declared that “sexual orientation is inherently a ‘sex-based
Sch. Dist., 282 F.3d 946, 951 (7th Cir. 2002) (“Title VII does not, however, provide
for a private right of action based on sexual orientation discrimination.”).
54
Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 762 (6th Cir. 2006) (perceived
sexual orientation and sexual harassment claim); Medina v. Income Support Div.,
N.M., 413 F.3d 1131, 1135 (10th Cir. 2005); Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co.,
260 F.3d 257, 261 (3d Cir. 2001); Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 35 (2d Cir.
2000); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir.
1999); Hopkins v. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745, 751–52 (4th Cir.
1996) (noting in a case of same-sex harassment that Title VII does not protect
against discrimination based on sexual orientation); U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban
Dev. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 964 F.2d 1, 2 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (assuming
without deciding that Title VII does not cover sexual orientation discrimination);
Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69, 70 (8th Cir. 1989); Blum v.
Gulf Oil Corp., 597 F.2d 936, 938 (5th Cir. 1979); but see Rene v. MGM Grand
Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061, 1068 (9th Cir. 2002) (gay male employee taunted and
harassed by coworkers for having feminine traits successfully pleaded claim of sex
harassment under Title VII).
55
Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 265 (3d Cir. 2001).
56
Arthur S. Leonard, Federal Trial Courts Divided Over Title VII Sexual
Orientation Discrimination Claims, ART LEONARD OBSERVATIONS (June 21, 2016),
http://www.artleonardobservations.com/federal-trial-courts-divided-title-vii-sexualorientation-discrimination-claims/.
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consideration’” protected by Title VII. 57 The decision is an
administrative ruling that is not binding on federal courts but is
entitled to some level of consideration and deference.58
The complainant, David Baldwin, worked as a Supervisory Air
Traffic Control Specialist for the Department of Transportation in
Miami, Florida.59 He alleged that he was not selected for a permanent
management position because of his status as a gay man.60 A
supervisor with promoting power made several negative comments
about his sexual orientation, such as “[w]e don’t need to hear about
that gay stuff” in reference to Mr. Baldwin’s mentioning his vacation
with his male partner as well as calling Mr. Baldwin “a distraction in
the radar room” when Mr. Baldwin discussed his male partner.61
Interpreting Price Waterhouse broadly, the EEOC stated that Title
VII’s prohibition of sex discrimination “means that employers may not
‘rely upon sex-based considerations’” when making employment
decisions.62 This protection, the EEOC stated, applies equally to
claims brought by lesbians, gays, and bisexuals.63 Acknowledging but
dismissing decades of precedent to the contrary, the EEOC quoted
Oncale: “statutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to
cover reasonably comparable evils, and it is ultimately the provisions
of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by
which we are governed.”64 Dismissing the textual argument that Title
57

Baldwin v. Foxx, EEOC Appeal No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641, at *5,
*10 (July 16, 2015).
58
See Magnuson v. Peak Technical Services, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 500, 513 (E.D.
Va. 1992).
59
Baldwin, 2015 WL 4397641, at *1.
60
Baldwin, 2015 WL 4397641, at *2.
61
Baldwin, 2015 WL 4397641, at *2.
62
Baldwin, 2015 WL 4397641, at *4 (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490
U.S. 228, 239, 241-42 (1989)).
63
Baldwin, 2015 WL 4397641, at *4.
64
Baldwin, 2015 WL 4397641, at *9 (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79, (1998)).
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VII does not explicitly include protections for sexual orientation
claimants, the EEOC stated:
[T]he question is not whether sexual orientation is explicitly
listed in Title VII as a prohibited basis for employment
actions. It is not. Rather, the question for purposes of Title
VII coverage of a sexual orientation claim is the same as any
other Title VII case involving allegations of sex
discrimination— whether the agency has “relied on sex-based
considerations” or “taken gender into account” when taking
the challenged employment action.65
In other words, sexual orientation cannot be separated from sex. A
man is labeled gay and a woman is labeled lesbian because he or she
prefers to romantically associate with the same sex.66 Sexual
orientation discrimination, then, is inextricably linked to sex and based
on sexual stereotypes, assumptions, expectations, and norms.
Moreover, sexual orientation discrimination itself is inextricably
linked to the employee’s sex. If a business fires a gay man “because of
his sexual activities with [another man], while this action would not
have been taken against [a woman] if she did exactly the same things
with [another man], then [the gay man] is being discriminated against
because of his sex.”67 Under this text-based and purposive analysis,
claimants need not frame their experiences in Price Waterhouse
gender-stereotype norms to be protected by Title VII.
The EEOC called out the Seventh Circuit’s Title VII
jurisprudence, amongst others, directly criticizing its failure to apply
65

Baldwin, 2015 WL 4397641, at *4 (citing Mia Macy v. Eric Holder, EEOC
Appeal No. 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995, at *6 (April 20, 2012)).
66
American Psychological Ass'n, Definition of Terms: Sex, Gender, Gender
Identity, Sexual Orientation (Feb. 2011),
http://www.apa.org/pi/lgbt/resources/sexuality-definitions.pdf (“Sexual
orientation refers to the sex of those to whom one is sexually and romantically
attracted.”).
67
Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men is
Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197, 208 (1994).
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Title VII to include protections against sexual orientation
discrimination.68 The source of its criticism was founded on the
Seventh Circuit “simply cit[ing] earlier and dated decisions without
any additional analysis” even in light of relevant, intervening Supreme
Court law.69
3.

Dissenting District Courts: Protecting Sexual Orientation
Claims

District courts, as “front line experimenters in the laboratories of
difficult legal questions,”70 have also finagled their way into applying
Title VII to the LGBT community. In response to the new EEOC
decision, one court has bluntly declared that the lines between sex
discrimination and sexual orientation discrimination are not merely
blurry, but are, in fact, un-definable.71 Other courts have joined in
dissent.72
Of the district courts that have found Title VII protects sexual
orientation claims, most have followed the EEOC’s reasoning that
sexual orientation discrimination is discrimination on the basis of
“sex.” For example, although the court ultimately granted summary
68

Baldwin, 2015 WL 4397641, at *8 n.11.
Id.
70
Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College, 830 F.3d 698, 703 (7th Cir. 2016).
71
Videckis v. Pepperdine Univ., 150 F. Supp. 3d 1151, 1160 (C.D. Cal. 2015)
(“Simply put, the line between sex discrimination and sexual orientation
discrimination is ‘difficult to draw’ because that line does not exist, save as a
lingering and faulty judicial construct.”).
72
See Koke v. Baumgardner, No. 15–CV–9673, 2016 WL 93094, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 2016) (“. . . [Based upon] the EEOC's recent holding that Title VII
prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, and the lack of a Supreme
Court ruling on whether Title VII applies to such claims, I cannot conclude, at least
at this stage, that plaintiff's Title VII claim is ‘wholly insubstantial and frivolous.’”);
Isaacs v. Felder Servs., LLC, 143 F. Supp. 3d 1190, 1193 (M.D. Ala. 2015) (“This
court agrees instead with the view of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission that claims of sexual orientation-based discrimination are cognizable
under Title VII.”); but see Hamilton v. Henderson Control, Inc., No. A-15-CV-594LY, 2016 WL 6892799, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 22, 2016) (following Hively).
69
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judgment against the employee for failing to demonstrate the
employer’s retaliation was the but-for cause of his termination, a
district court in Alabama expressly agreed with the EEOC finding that
“sexual orientation-based discrimination [is] cognizable under Title
VII.”73 In another case, a California district court found that two
lesbian basketball players stated a “straightforward claim for sex
discrimination” by alleging university staff members told them their
lesbianism would not be tolerated on the team.74 Applying the same
logic as the EEOC, the court reasoned that sexual orientation
discrimination is necessarily sex discrimination because “[i]f Plaintiffs
had been males dating females, instead of females dating females, they
would not have been subjected to the alleged different treatment.”75
Sexual orientation discrimination is therefore sex discrimination. The
District of Connecticut boldly reached the same conclusion based on
the same logic, explicitly disagreeing with the Seventh Circuit’s result
in Hively and Second Circuit precedent to the contrary.76
But not all courts protecting the LGBT community have adopted
the EEOC’s sexual orientation is sex position, though, and some
continue to frame the claims in gender stereotype terms. Recently, a
district court in Florida ruled that discrimination based on perceived
sexual orientation was actionable under Title VII.77 Plaintiffs, Susan
Winstead and Deborah Langford, alleged, amongst other things, that
coworkers at the Lafayette County Board contacted residents served
by plaintiffs and encouraged them to register false complaints against
plaintiffs.78 The coworkers allegedly then harassed the plaintiffs on
Facebook, other online forums, and even on radio and television.79
73

Isaacs, 143 F. Supp. 3d at 1193–94 (“This court agrees with the view of the
[EEOC]. . .”).
74
Videckis, 150 F. Supp. 3d at 1161.
75
Id.
76
Boutillier v. Hartford Public Schools, No. 3:13-cv-01303-WWE, 2016 WL
6818348, at *11 (D. Conn. Nov. 21, 2016).
77
Winstead v. Lafayette County Board of County Commissioners, No.
1:16CV00054-MW-GRJ, 2016 WL 3946922 (N.D. Fl. June 20, 2016).
78
Id. at *1.
79
Id.
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The court rejected the EEOC’s position that sexual orientation
discrimination is necessarily sex discrimination.80 Rather, the Florida
court found that sexual orientation discrimination fits neatly under
Price Waterhouse’s gender stereotype claim.81 The court recognized
that the Plaintiffs had stated a claim under gender stereotype theory
even if they had not acted “butch.”82 To arbitrarily reject claims of
homosexuals who otherwise conformed to gender norms would be to
“misapprehend the nature of animus towards people based on their
sexual orientation.”83 That animus is based on disapproval of
behaviors that are disapproved of “precisely because they are deemed
to be “inappropriate” for members of a certain sex or gender.”84
C.

Congress’s Inaction and State Anti-Discrimination Statutes

Congress’s inaction has significantly influenced courts’ failure to
read Title VII in a manner that protects the LGBT community.85
Congress is not unaware of the plight of the LGBT community to
obtain protection under Title VII. On the contrary, it has considered
and rejected amending the Civil Rights Act to add “sexual orientation”
innumerable times, dating back as early as 1974.86 The 1974 Equality
80

Id. at *6–7 (citing Baldwin v. Foxx, Appeal No. 0120133080, 2015 WL
4397641, at *5 (EEOC July 15, 2015)).
81
Id. at *7.
82
See Soucek, supra note 40.
83
Winstead v. Lafayette County Board of County Commissioners, No.
1:16CV00054-MW-GRJ, 2016 WL 3946922, at *8 (N.D. Fl. June 20, 2016).
84
Id.
85
Kiley v. American Soc. For Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 296 Fed.
Appx. 107, 109 (2d Cir. 2008) (concluding based on the numerous bills that have
attempted to extend Title VII protection to sexual orientation that Congress did not
intend to include sexual orientation protections in Title VII’s current form); Ulane v.
Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1086 (7th Cir. 1984) (saying that Congress’s
failure to amend Title VII “strongly indicates . . . sex should be given a . . .
traditional interpretation” that does not encompass sexual orientation).
86
See, e.g., Employment Nondiscrimination Act of 1996, S.2056, 104th Cong.
(1996); Employment Non Discrimination Act of 1995, H.R. 1863, 104th Cong.
(1995); Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 1994, H.R. 4636, 103rd Cong.
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Act was broadly drafted to protect the LGBT community in all arenas
of public life beyond employment.87 Due to a variety of social and
political factors, it never earned enough support to make it out of the
House Committee on Judiciary.88 Lawmakers went silent on the issue
for about twenty years.
The silence was broken in 1994 with the introduction of the
Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA).89 ENDA was narrowly
focused on prohibiting discrimination in the workplace based on actual
or perceived sexual orientation.90 But the law failed to pass.91 Since
ENDA’s introduction, Congress has considered some version of the
Act every single session but one.92
Congress is currently considering The Equality Act.93 Introduced
in 2015, it has more congressional support than any of its
predecessors.94 The Act differs from its predecessors in that it would
directly amend The Civil Rights Act to add sexual orientation and
gender identity as protected classes.95 But the bill has been stuck in the
House Subcommittee on the Constitution and Civil Justice since
September 8th, 2015.96
(1994); Jerome Hunt, A History of the Employment Non-Discrimination Act, Center
for American Progress (July 19, 2011),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/lgbt/news/2011/07/19/10006/a-history-ofthe-employment-non-discrimination-act/ (“[the] Equality Act of 1974 never earned
enough support to make it out of committee in the House, and it was never
introduced in the Senate.”).
87
Hunt, supra note 86.
88
Equality Act, H.R. 14752, 93rd Cong. (1973–1974).
89
Hunt, supra note 86.
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
H.R. 3185, 114th Cong. (2015-2016).
94
The Equality Act, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN (last updated Aug. 1, 2016),
http://www.hrc.org/resources/the-equality-act.
95
Id.
96
See All Actions – H.R. 3185, CONGRESS.GOV,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/3185/all-actions (last
visited Oct. 13, 2016).
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Despite vast misconceptions that sexual orientation discrimination
is already illegal,97 the federal government has not prohibited it, and
the majority of states lack local anti-discrimination statutes that
provide protections for LGBT persons in the workplace.98 Only
twenty-one states currently prohibit discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation, and only eighteen protect transgendered persons.99
According to the Human Rights Campaign, thirty-two states lack clear
and fully inclusive anti-discrimination laws for the LGBT
community.100
With this legislative background and jurisprudence in mind, we
turn to the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Hively v. Ivy Tech Community
College.
II. HIVELY V. IVY TECH COMMUNITY COLLEGE
Kimberly Hively worked as an adjunct instructor in mathematics
at Ivy Tech Community College in Indiana from 2000 to 2013.101 She
excelled in her position, winning the “Adjunct Faculty Award for
Excellence in Instruction” on the South Bend campus.102 Over the
course of her five years, she applied repeatedly for permanent
positions at the college for which she was qualified.103 Ivy Tech first
rejected her applications before finally refusing to continue her
97

One poll reported that 87% of Americans believe it is already illegal to
discriminate against gay people. Steinmetz, supra note 4.
98
Lorenz, supra note 2.
99
Steinmetz, supra note 4.
100
Human Rights Campaign, Why The Equality Act?,
http://www.hrc.org/resources/why-the-equality-act (last visited Sept. 29, 2016).
101
Scott Jaschik, Legal Discrimination, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Aug. 1, 2016),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2016/08/01/appeals-court-says-adjunct-maynot-sue-college-under-title-vii-bias-related-sexual.
102
Ivy Tech Community College Instructor Receives Top Honor, INSIDE IVY
TECH COMMUNITY C., (Mar. 13, 2012), https://news.ivytech.edu/2012/03/13/ivytech-community-college-instructor-receives-top-honor-2/.
103
Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College, 2015 WL 926015, at *1 (N.D. Ill.
Mar. 3, 2015).
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contract as an adjunct.104 She connected the dots between her sexuality
and her rejections when she overheard administrators commenting to
others about her being in a relationship with another woman.105
Ms. Hively filed a bare-bones pro se charge with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) claiming she was
discriminated against because of her sexual orientation.106 After
exhausting procedural requirements in the EEOC, she filed a pro se
complaint against the school in the district court of Indiana.107 Fatal to
her complaint, Ms. Hively alleged that she was “denied fulltime
employment and promotions based on sexual orientation” in violation
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.108 Ivy Tech filed a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim because sexual orientation is not
recognized as a protected class under Title VII. 109 Although the court
empathized with Ms. Hively’s pro se status and her arguments, the
court stated it was “bound by Seventh Circuit precedent” and had no
choice but to dismiss the complaint with prejudice.110
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit’s opinion reads like one long
exhale. Judge Rovner authored the opinion joined in part by Judge
Ripple.111 Judge Bauer did not join the judgment.112 The court began
by noting it could “make short shrift of its task” and simply affirm the
district court’s opinion based on clear Seventh Circuit precedent.113
Indeed, two cases decided in 2000 made clear that Title VII does not
protect claims based on a person’s sexual preference or orientation:

104

Id.
Jaschik, supra note 101.
106
Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College, 830 F.3d 698, 698 (7th Cir. 2016).
107
Id.
108
Hively, 2015 WL 926015, at *1 (emphasis added).
109
Id.
110
Id. at *3.
111
Hively, 830 F.3d at 698.
112
Id.
113
Id.
105
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Hamner and Spearman.114 Precedent was unequivocally stacked
against Ms. Hively. So, despite compelling policy concerns to find to
the contrary, the Seventh Circuit was “presumptively bound by [its]
own precedent.”115
But case law was not the only factor that forced the court’s hand.
The court was also persuaded by Congress’s utter inaction to correct
decades of court’s interpretation of Title VII, despite a consistent trend
in public opinion and courts calling for change.116 The court chimed in
with the slew of other federal courts that have called discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation a “reprehensible,”117and “noxious
practice, deserving of censure.”118 The court acknowledged the
EEOC’s recent shift towards applying Title VII to prohibit sexual
orientation discrimination.119 But without more, this “writing on the
wall” was not enough.120
The court thoroughly described the struggles amongst federal
courts to deal with the seemingly unworkable standards of evaluating
sexual orientation claims under Price Waterhouse.121 But no matter
how difficult to disentangle gender discrimination from sexual
orientation discrimination, the court refused to conclude it was

114

Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 231 F.3d 1080, 1085 (7th Cir. 2000); Hamner
v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 224 F.3d 701, 704 (7th Cir. 2000).
115
Hively, 830 F.3d at 701.
116
Id. (“Our holdings and those of other courts reflect the fact that despite
multiple efforts, Congress has repeatedly rejected legislation that would have
extended Title VII to cover sexual orientation.”).
117
Kay v. Indep. Blue Cross, 142 Fed. Appx. 48, 51 (3d Cir. 2005);
Christiansen v. Omnicom Grp., Inc., 2015 WL 951581, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9,
2016).
118
Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir.
1999).
119
Hively, 830 F.3d at 703 (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,
433–34 (1971)).
120
Id. at 718.
121
Id. at 704–708.
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“impossible.”122 Bluntly, the court stated it could not do so “unless or
until either the legislature or the Supreme Court says it is so.”123
The court was fully aware of the unjust result that followed from
adhering to this line of precedent, calling it “an odd state of affairs” in
which Title VII only protects gays, lesbians, and bisexual persons that
blatantly, outwardly express their sexuality.124 The effeminate man is
protected while the gay man who otherwise conforms to traditional
masculine stereotypes is not. Nonetheless, the court exasperatedly
concluded that this was not its call to make.125
The Hively opinion has been vacated and scheduled for rehearing
en banc.126 In the Seventh Circuit’s own words, it usually only rehears
cases en banc to address an intra-circuit split, not involved here, or a
“question of exceptional importance.”127 On rehearing, the court will
face the same handful of options. The court can again follow the
overwhelming precedent that, based on Congress’ original intent and
current inaction, Title VII simply does not prohibit sexual orientation
discrimination.128 But the court can find for Ms. Hively without
disregarding the law by following the EEOC’s recent interpretation
that sexual orientation discrimination is necessarily “sex”
discrimination.129 More likely, the court could be the first court to
definitively interpret sexual orientation claims under the gender
stereotype framework set out in Price Waterhouse.130 Because a
gender stereotype of women is that they romantically associate with
122

Id. at 709.
Id.
124
Id. at 714.
125
Id.
126
Diana Novak Jones, Full 7th Circ. Could Be Ready to Ban Sexual
Orientation Bias, LAW360 (Nov. 30, 2016, 4:47 PM EST),
http://www.law360.com/corporate/articles/867289/full-7th-circ-could-be-ready-toban-sexual-orientation-bias/.
127
Easley v. Reuss, 532 F.3d 592, 594 (7th Cir. 2008).
128
Jones, supra note 126.
129
See Baldwin v. Foxx, EEOC Appeal No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641,
at *4 (July 16, 2015).
130
See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 240 (1989).
123
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men, Ms. Hively was discriminated against on the basis of her sex
when Ivy Tech discriminated against her for romantically associating
with women. This option seems most likely given the panel’s
questions at the en banc hearing.131 Indeed, counsel for Lambda Legal
Defense, Ms. Hively’s representative, based his arguments in Price
Waterhouse terms, analogizing that discriminating against a woman
because she drives a Harley or has football season tickets is in
precisely the same vein as discriminating against her for her attraction
to women.132 The court’s holding will greatly impact current LGBT
rights litigation, extending into the Title IX gender identity bathroom
litigation as well.133
The Seventh Circuit also has the opportunity to address this issue
in a similar sexual orientation discrimination claim that was dismissed
in the Northern District of Illinois in the wake of Hively: Matavka v.
Board of Education.134 The court initially stayed the case pending the
Hively decision, apparently hopeful that the EEOC’s change of
position might persuade the Seventh Circuit.135 The Plaintiff, Lubomir
Matavka alleged that while employed at Morton High School his
coworkers and supervisors verbally taunted him for his sexual
orientation, even hacking into his Facebook account to publicly out
him as “interested in ‘boys and men.’”136
In dismissing the Complaint, the court called the defendants’
conduct “disgusting” 137 and “appalling”138 but nonetheless not
131

Jones, supra note 126.
Id.
133
See, e.g., Students v. United States Dep’t of Educ., No. 16-cv-4945 2016
WL 6134121, at *17 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 18, 2016) (“Whether or not the court of appeals
does so, however, its en banc decision could have an important impact on Plaintiffs'
argument about the meaning of the term “sex” in Title VII and, by implication, in
Title IX.”).
134
Matavka v. Bd. of Educ. of J. Sterling Morton High Sch. Dist. 201, No. 15
C 10330, 2016 WL 4119949, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 1, 2016).
135
Id. at *4.
136
Id. at *3.
137
Id.
138
Id. at *1.
132
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prohibited by Title VII under Hively. The court discussed the Seventh
Circuit’s perhaps misplaced adherence to stare decisis, noting that
Brown v. Board of Education, too, required the Court to go against
decades of precedent.139 Even so, the court noted that uprooting an
unjust manner of judicially interpreting the Constitution was “a matter
quite different” from changing the established judicial interpretation of
“a word contained in congressional legislation.”140 Matavka has filed
an appeal.141
Courts’ struggle to apply Title VII inclusively begs the question of
whether they are the appropriate branch of government to resolve this
issue. From where should we expect change? And from where is
change best suited for long-lasting protection for the LGBT
community? What branch will remedy the incongruence that “[w]e
allow two women or two men to marry, but allow employers to
terminate them for doing so[?]”142 Ideally, Congress is best suited to
resolve this issue. But this solution seems less and less viable as
Congress becomes even more partisan, gridlocked, and
conservative.143

139

Id. at *2 (citing Brown v. Bd of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)) (“Stare decisis
is not however immutable—perhaps the most noteworthy example of our time has
been the unanimous decision of the Supreme Court in [Brown v. Board of
Education].”).
140
Id.
141
Matavka v. Bd. of Educ. of J. Sterling Morton High Sch. Dist. 201, No. 15
C 10330, 2016 WL 4119949 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 1, 2016), appeal docketed, No. 16-3298
(7th Cir. Aug. 29, 2016).
142
Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College, 830 F.3d 698, 717 (7th Cir. 2016)
143
See James Arkin, Trump Gets a Republican Congress, REAL CLEAR
POLITICS (Nov. 9, 2016),
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2016/11/09/trump_gets_a_republican_cong
ress.html.
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III. IMPLICATIONS OF HIVELY: CONGRESS MUST ACT
The court in Hively noted that the Supreme Court has consistently
expounded on LGBT rights.144 But even though this “informed” the
legal landscape of Title VII, it had “no direct bearing” on the outcome
of the case.145 Even though “the writing is on the wall,” that writing
must come from the Supreme Court or Congress.146 The Panel’s now
vacated opinion seemed to emphasize the impossibility of a judicial
remedy for expanding LGBT rights under Title VII. Part of this
struggle stems from the traditional tools of statutory interpretation,
most of which naturally lead to the exclusion of sexual orientation
discrimination.
Merriam-Webster defines “sex” in biological terms as “the state of
being male or female.”147 From a traditionally textualist perspective,
then, discrimination on the basis of ‘sex’ is the classic scenario of
refusing to hire a woman because she is a woman. But even an
approach based on legislative intent does not provide protections for
LGBT community. While it is possible to grab juicy quotes from the
legislative history and argue they encompass LGBT rights, it is
undisputed that Congress was not concerned with sexual orientation
discrimination when it enacted the Civil Rights Act.148 On the
144

Hively, 830 F.3d at 713 (reviewing the Court’s decisions in Romer v. Evans,
517 U.S. 620 (1996), Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), United States v.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013), and Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584
(2015)). The court noted that the Court had the opportunity to address sexual
orientation discrimination in Obergefell but declined to do so.
145
Id.
146
Id. at 718.
147
MERRIAM WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/sex (last
visited Sept. 29, 2016).
148
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv’s, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998) (sexual
orientation discrimination “was assuredly not the principal evil Congress was
concerned with when it enacted Title VII.”). Indeed, because “sex” was added
through House floor amendment, the Committee Report says nothing about “sex”
discrimination. There is a dearth of legislative history that even speaks to traditional
instances of sex discrimination. Leonard, supra note 56.
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contrary, it is widely known that the word “sex” was added to the Bill
in the hopes of destroying its chances of being passed.149
Nonetheless, a court could still resolve the issue either by
embracing the EEOC’s allegedly text-based position that “sexual
orientation is sex” or by following the purposive based theory that
swallows sexual orientation claims into gender stereotype claims
under Price Waterhouse. As Judge Posner noted at the en banc
hearing, the meaning of the statute is not “frozen on the day of
enactment,” and it is common if not appropriate to interpret a statute
differently as times change.150 Significant scholarship has been
dedicated to encouraging courts to fully embrace sexual orientation
discrimination claims under the latter approach.151 The argument that
“gay people, simply by identifying themselves as gay, are violating the
ultimate gender stereotype—heterosexual attraction” is compelling.152
Indeed, Judge Rovner explicitly identified this stereotype in the now
vacated opinion.153
But there is no guarantee a trip to the Supreme Court would result
in a favorable outcome for the LGBT community. Although Justice
Kennedy joined the “liberals” in Obergefell, Obergefell dealt with
fundamental constitutional rights under the Equal Protection Clause—
an area where Kennedy is known for his expansive, even ethereal,

149

Leonard, supra note 56 (explaining that southern representative Howard
Smith of Virginia included the word “sex” in the hopes of sinking the bill).
150
Jones, supra note 131.
151
See, e.g., Cody Perkins, Comment, Sex & Sexual Orientation: Title VII
After Macy v. Holder, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 427, 442 (2013) (“Just as the
impermissible discrimination in [Price Waterhouse] was directed at the plaintiff for
being a woman who transgressed gender norms by acting masculinely [sic], a gay
woman who is discriminated against for being a woman who acts masculinely
[sic] by having the traditionally male trait of being attracted to women is being
discriminated against on the basis of a sex stereotype.”).
152
Anthony E. Varona & Jeffrey M. Monks, En/Gendering Equality: Seeking
Relief Under Title VII Against Employment Discrimination Based on Sexual
Orientation, 7 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 67, 84 (2000).
153
Hively, 830 F.3d at 709.
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beliefs.154 It is not certain he would expand LGBT rights so broadly
when ruling on a question of settled statutory interpretation. Scholars
have pointed out that Title VII litigation as a whole has stalled or
regressed under the Roberts Court, evidencing a “skepticism about the
persistence of intentional sex and race discrimination.”155 Now that
present and future Supreme Court vacancies will likely be filled by a
republican appointee, it is even less likely this avenue is a productive
choice for the LGBT community. Indeed, though most scholars agree
that the fundamental right to marry is likely secure, the LGBT agenda
as a whole is certainly on shaky grounds.156 As of this Comment’s
writing, every single cabinet member of President-elect Trump
affirmatively opposes LGBT rights.157
The Executive Branch under President Obama has done all it can
do to protect the LGBT community in the near future. Long before
Obergefell, President Obama received pressure to bar discrimination
against LGBT persons in employment through executive order.158 In
154
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2014, President Obama signed an Executive Order prohibiting federal
contractors from discriminating against LGBT members in the
workplace.159 Obama correctly stated that the order would make the
government “just a little bit fairer”— indeed, the President lacks the
authority to impact the private sector.160 And it is doubtful that
President Trump has LGBT rights on his agenda.161
The root of the problem lies in Title VII itself. No branch is better
suited to address incongruences within the Act than the creators.
Congress must act and clarify whether or not sexual orientation is “sex
discrimination” under Title VII. Even though Congress has failed to do
so for over twenty years, there simply does not exist a better solution
than a change in the legislation.
The opportunity has arisen again. Senator Jeff Merkley and
Representative David Cicilline162 introduced The Equality Act in July
of 2015.163 The Act would amend the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to
include sexual orientation and gender identity among protected
classes.164 More than 80 corporations have signed on in support of the
bill, including big names like Amazon, American Airlines, Coca-Cola,
Facebook, and Google.165 But, the bill is currently sitting before the
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Subcommittee on the Constitution and Civil Justice, where it has
remained for over a year.166
The bill states explicitly that “discrimination can occur on the
basis of the sex, sexual orientation, gender identity . . . of an
individual.”167 The bill recognizes the history of discrimination against
LGBT in the workplace: “Workers who are LGBT, or are perceived to
be LGBT, have been subjected to a history and pattern of persistent,
widespread, and pervasive discrimination on the bases of sexual
orientation and gender identity by private sector employers and
Federal, State, and local government employers.”168 Finally, the bill
explicitly approves of the EEOC’s recent and “correct[]” interpretation
of Title VII to protect LGBT persons and rejects conflicting case law
that has refused to do so.169
Polling indicates that federal protections for the LGBT is in large
part a bipartisan issue.170 A 2015, pre-Obergefell survey showed that
voters across party lines support the bill by a margin of 69 to 27.171
Within these margins, even a majority of Republican citizens support
the bill.172 Sixty-four percent of voters said they would be less likely
to support their member of Congress if he or she opposed the bill.173
Congress has no excuse to sit on their hands or vote on party lines on
this issue. In directly amending the Civil Rights Act itself, Congress
members cannot object to the bill out of fear and speculation of what a
new set of rights would mean for employers.174 Literally the exact
same protections that have applied to race, religion, sex, ethnicity, and
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national origin for over fifty years would be extended to the LGBT
community. Similarly, the same religious exemptions would apply.
Regardless of how the Seventh Circuit rules in Hively, Congress
must act to provide protections for LGBT employees against this
invidious discrimination. This Comment remains hopeful that the
Seventh Circuit is ready to step out as the first court to definitively
interpret sexual orientation discrimination under the gender stereotype
framework set forth by Price Waterhouse. Hopefully, this will set the
tone for more federal circuits to break away from slavishly following
old methods of interpreting Title VII. But until Congress provides this
protection, LGBT employees may only hope to be lucky enough to
live in a state that protects him or her through its local antidiscrimination law or a federal circuit that has decided to interpret
Title VII expansively. This result simply cannot be squared with the
norms and values largely embraced by society and recognized by the
Supreme Court in Obergefell v. Hodges.175
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